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 THREE FORMS OF PHYSICAL MEASUREMENT AND THEIR
COMPUTABILITY
EDWIN BEGGS, JOSE´ FE´LIX COSTA, AND JOHN V TUCKER
Abstract. We have begun a theory of measurement in which an experimenter and
his or her experimental procedure are modelled by algorithms that interact with physical
equipment through a simple abstract interface. The theory is based upon using models of
physical equipment as oracles to Turing machines. This allows us to investigate the com-
putability and computational complexity of measurement processes. We examine eight
different experiments that make measurements, and, by introducing the idea of an observ-
able indicator, we identify three distinct forms of measurement process and three types of
measurement algorithm. We give axiomatic specifications of three forms of interfaces that
enable the three types of experiment to be used as oracles to Turing machines, and lemmas
that help certify an experiment satisfies the axiomatic specifications. For experiments that
satisfy our axiomatic specifications, we give lower bounds on the computational power of
Turing machines in polynomial time using non-uniform complexity classes. These lower
bounds break the barrier defined by the Church-Turing Thesis.
§1. Introduction. Imagine a simple experiment to measure a physical quan-
tity. An experimenter applies an experimental procedure to some equipment and
generates a sequence of values that measures the quantity to some degree of ac-
curacy. The procedure is systematic and precisely defined to enable it to be
reproduced by others elsewhere. Due to its systematic and precise nature, the
experimental procedure can be thought of as an algorithm that governs each step
in the experimental process by instructions that include physical and mathemat-
ical operations.
Indeed, in practice, many experiments are controlled, at least partially, by
software. The software codes a set of algorithms that can generate data to oper-
ate equipment, and collect and analyse mathematically data from observations.
The human experimenter is supported by, or is dependent on, software in all
sorts of ways. We have begun to develop an algorithmic theory of measurement
based on the radical idea that the human experimenter, the systematic and pre-
cise procedure that defines the experiment, and his or her software tools, are all
replaced by a computer running a complex program that interacts with physical
equipment through an abstract interface.
The mathematical theory of computability provides a vast range of concepts,
methods and theorems to model formally algorithms, programs and machines
and to analyse their behaviour, scope and limits. Applying computability the-
ory, we have proposed the following idea:
The human experimenter and his or her systematic and precise experimental
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procedure can be modelled by a Turing machine; and the interaction with physi-
cal equipment can be modelled by using the physical equipment as an oracle that
is connected to the Turing machine via an interface and operational protocol for
queries.
The theory developed from this idea enables us to analyse some basic questions
about measurement, including:
(i) What is the algorithmic nature of the process of measuring?
(ii) What are the costs in time to perform measurements to a given accuracy?
(iii) What are the limitations to measurements imposed by equipment, exper-
imental procedures and resource constraints?
There are indeed limitations. Elsewhere, in [13], we have begun to answer
(iii) by showing that if experiments are controlled by algorithms then not all
physical quantities can be measured even in simple classical experiments. The
theory focusses on logical properties of measurement and enables us ask new
open-ended questions:
(iv) Can measurement processes for obtaining physical data be classified by
analysing their logical or algorithmic complexity?
(v) What information can or cannot be computed with the physical data we
obtain from measurement processes?
In the matter of (v), we have in mind the processing of data after it has been
obtained from experiments, instruments, sensors, etc. We have shown – and
will show once more here – that a variety of physical equipment used as oracles
can boost the power of algorithms beyond the Turing barrier: sets that are
algorithmically undecidable can be decided by algorithms enhanced by physical
oracles: see the sequence of papers [6, 5, 7, 8, 14, 13, 15].
The first part of the paper addresses question (i) above. We focus on the
measurement of a physical quantity by an experimenter following a procedure
to operate apparatus. In Section 2, we use Hempel’s axiomatic conception of
measurement by trial-and-error to introduce a simple taxonomy of three distinct
logical types of measurement process. We do this by introducing a function we
call an observable indicator whose curve illustrates a key characteristic of the
measurement. Then, in the following Sections 3-5, we describe eight examples
of experiments to illustrate each logical type in the taxonomy. The experiments
vary, involving: weighing scales, particle collisions, optical refraction, electrical
resistance, scattering in an electric field, and photoelectric effects. The taxonomy
and examples lead us to identify three distinct forms of measurement process
characterised by three types of algorithm, each with a natural iterative structure;
these are defined and compared in Section 6. We call these signed, vanishing and
threshold measurements.
The second part of the paper addresses questions (iv) and (v) above. In the
following Sections 6-11 we connect the three types of experiments to our theory
of measurement based upon physical oracles to Turing machines. In Section 8,
we specify axiomatically three abstract interfaces that allows any algorithm to
operate or access the equipment. The axiomatic specifications of the interfaces
to the Turing machines are relatively abstract and so in Section 8 we include
Certification Lemmas, involving the observable indicators, to help demonstrate
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that physical experiments actually satisfy the axioms. The axiomatic approach
generalises the methods of [18, 16].
To measure a physical quantity we would simply apply one of the three basic
measurement algorithms of Section 6 to the axiomatic interface. However, as
the quantity is being measured, one can also perform computations with the
intermediate results. More radically, the axiomatic specification of the interface
allows one to throw any algorithm at the equipment. The scope of all possible
algorithms applied to the interfaces are mapped by the following theorems.
Each axiomatic specification of an interface defines a very general class E(G) of
experiments to measure a physical quantity which can reasonably act as physical
oracles to an algorithm. One of the interface’s main properties is a set G of
functions on the natural numbers that bound the time taken to make an oracle
query, i.e., to initialise and run the equipment, make an observation and return
data to the algorithm.
The certification lemmas provide sufficient conditions on an experiment for
it to belong to the general class E(G) and especially to practically important
classes. For each of the three types of experiment, we prove theorems that give
a lower bound on complexity of the experiment expressed by its computational
power. To do this we use non-uniform computability and complexity notions
[2, 3]. Each theorem takes the following form:
Theorem 1. Given a decision problem A in the non-uniform complexity class
NK, there is a real value x ∈ (0, 1) so that any physical experiment in the class
E(GNK) measuring x can be used as an oracle to a Turing machine to decide A
in polynomial time.
The three theorems, stated as Theorem 5 in subsection 10.2, confirm that each
form of experiment has the same lower bound on computational power, which is
beyond the Turing barrier. We end the paper with some general remarks.
§2. A theory of measurement. In developing our ideas we are engaging
with the philosophical foundations of measurement, which is a large technical
subject, created by problems in the philosophies of physical science and be-
havioural science. It begins in the nineteenth century in work of Helmholtz in
1887 and acquires a logical axiomatic basis early on, making it mathematical and
abstract. A synthesis of approaches by Suppes [31] led to a coherent mathemat-
ical representation theory of measurement. The theory explains how numerical
representations of qualitative attributes are possible and is laid out in the mag-
num opus Krantz et al. [28, 32, 29]. We will need a very simple analysis as our
guideline.
2.1. Hempel on measurement. Consider Carl Hempel’s axiomatic analysis
of measurement. According to [26], there are three stages to physical measure-
ment:
Classification. In which entities are sorted according to similarities (e.g., using
weight rather than colour, or ‘heavy’ and ‘light’).
Comparison. In which attributes of entities are compared by observations and
events (e.g., ‘less heavy than’).
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Quantification. In which attributes are scaled by assigning numerical values
that preserve basic comparisons (e.g., mass is 4 Kilograms).
To sort and compare attributes, Hempel proposes a comparative concept, (O|E,L)
which is a relational structure that consists of a set O of objects, and two binary
relations E,L on O such that
1. E is an equivalence relation
2. L is transitive
3. L is E-connected, i.e. ¬ aEb ⇒ (aLb or bLa)
4. L is E-irreflexive, i.e. aEb ⇒ ¬ aLb
A comparative concept is “witnessed” by an experimental apparatus, whose phys-
ical events define E and L.
To quantify attributes, Hempel defines a measurement map M : O → R for
the comparative concept (O|E,L), where R is the set of real numbers. The
measurement map is any map obeying the following rules for all a, b ∈ O:
5. aEb ⇒ M(a) =M(b)
6. aLb ⇒ M(a) <M(b)
The framework is most simply illuminated by thinking of the process of mea-
suring mass using a balance scale: imagine an unknown mass x on one pan and
placing a test value a on the other to make a comparison say xLa. We will return
to this model later.
We can use Hempel’s abstract framework to investigate the structure of ex-
periments and the limits they frequently impose on what can be measured. For
example, in a previous paper [12], we considered the amount of time required
to perform measurements to varying degrees of accuracy. We may suppose that
getting an exact answer for equality of two quantities, aEb is often impractical
as it would take an infinite amount of time.1
For the moment, we focus on the comparison of two quantities aLb, ignore the
amount of time taken and assume only that it is finite. Then we can measure
such a comparison aLb and get a definite answer in many cases.
2.2. Three forms of comparison. As we will show shortly, consideration
of several experiments that witness the comparison of two quantities uncovers
three distinct and commonly occurring cases. We define them now.
Suppose that x is a physical quantity to be measured and a is a test value
generated for comparison in an experiment; we assume that the quantities x, a ∈
R. We classify experiments into three cases, depending on what comparisons
can actually be made:
1. Signed comparison: aLx and xLa can be tested separately.
Most of the experiments we have analysed to date have been of this form and
we recall some below, e.g., collider machine in which x is the unknown mass and
a is the projected particle [13].
1There are many examples of infinite time in our papers. Even in special cases, there can
be problems, such as using quantisation of charge to measure equality of two electrical charges
in a finite time involves the need to experimentally verify that all charges come in multiples of
a single unit.
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2. Vanishing comparison: Only the predicate (aLx or xLa) can be tested
(i.e., only inequality can be tested).
Experiments of this form will be discussed later and include Brewster’s angle
(x is the angle of incidence of a beam of light), and the heat measurement for
Wheatstone bridge (x is the unknown resistance).
3. Threshold comparison: Only aLx can be tested.
Experiments of this form will be discussed later and include the broken beam
balance, the scattering of charged particles in an Coulombian field and the pho-
toelectric effect.
Before looking at experiments in detail, it will be useful to consider a very
general thought experiment to illustrate these three cases and explore the ideas
of signed, vanishing and threshold comparisons.
Definition 1. Consider an experiment in which we generate various test val-
ues a ∈ R and compare them against a physical quantity x ∈ R in an apparatus.
Suppose that for each test, and given sufficient finite time, the experiment yields
a result that is a measurable physical quantity F (a) ∈ R, which yields quantita-
tive information on the comparison between a and x. Specifically, we suppose
that there is a function F : [0, 1] → R such that if a = x then F (a) = 0. The
function F we call an observable indicator for the experiment.
We give three graphs in which F (a) is plotted on the vertical axis against a
on the horizontal axis with F (a) = 0 if a = x. The three graphs of Figures 1, 2
and 3 correspond to the three comparison cases mentioned earlier.
The experimental procedure applied to a yields information F (a) from which
we can make a comparison with x and proceed to generate further test values.
In the signed case (1), by measuring the sign of F (a) we can find whether
a < x or whether x < a. If the function F (a) is continuous, we can use bisection
to approximate x.
In vanishing case (2), a measured value F (a) > 0 could correspond to either
a < x or x < a. In this case it is very obvious that we must make further
assumptions on the function F (a) in order to be able to approximate the value
x. For example, an assumption that F (a) is strictly increasing for a > x and
strictly decreasing for a < x will suffice.
a
x
Figure 1. Signed Measure both a < x and x < a. A bisection
method can be used to find x. Measure both a < x and x < a.
Assume continuity.
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a
x
Figure 2. Vanishing Can only measure (a < x or x < a). A
modified bisection method will work. Assume monotonicity on
each side of x.
In threshold case (3), all values a ≥ x give F (a) = 0. We can give a sequence
of test values tending to x from below. To have any idea of an upper bound for
x, or how fast the sequence is converging to x, we need further information on
the the function F (a).
a
x
Figure 3. Threshold Can only measure a < x. Can give a
sequence of tests approximating x from below.
Of course, there is another possible case of (3), where we reverse the graph,
and have all values a ≤ x giving F (a) = 0. Instead of having cases (3a) and
(3b), we will merely note that a trivial change of variables relates the choices,
and continue with the case above.
In all cases, we are dependent on having some information on the observable
indicator function F (a) to be able to perform the measurement. All measurement
is done within the context of a physical theory, which is the source of such
information. Physical theories, and particular fragments of physical theories,
are fundamental parameters in our theory of measurement.
§3. Case 1: Measurements based on signed comparisons. This is a
case we have already met previously when developing our theory (see [13]). It is
very common in experimental setups.
3.1. A balance. Possibly the simplest is the balance, illustrated in Figure
4. If x < a, then the left arm of the balance moves down, and, if x > a, then
the left arm of the balance moves up. We take the observable indicator F (a) to
be the angle of the balance arm with the horizontal; according to the statics, if
a = x then F (a) = 0.
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a x
O
Figure 4. Schematic representation of balance.
3.2. The collider machine. Next we recall from [13] a simple example, the
collider machine, illustrated in Figure 5.
The initial velocity for the test particle of mass m is approximately 1m/s.
After the collision, the test particle is observed to cross the flags P± within the
time limit, or not (out of time). The time texp taken to reach the flags satisfies
(for some constants A and B):
A
|m− µ| ≤ texp ≤
B
|m− µ| .(1)
If the flag P+ is crossed within the time limit, we return m > µ, and if P− is
crossed, we return m < µ. We can take the observable indicator F (m) to be the
scalar speed of the test particle after the collision.
2 m
P− P+
O
before the collision
unknown masstest mass
|~u| = 1 ms−1
P− P+
O
after the collision
unknown masstest mass
~vm ~vµ
Figure 5. Collision experiment.
3.3. The Wheatstone bridge. Another example is the Wheatstone bridge
experiment to measure an electrical resistance from [14]. The circuit diagram
is shown in Figure 6. We measure the fixed resistance % given a user variable
resistance ρ. If ρ = %, then the current i0 = 0.
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% ρ
%ρ
r
G
H
A Bi i
i0
i?
i − i?
Figure 6. The Wheatstone bridge.
We measure the sign of i0 by using the current to charge a capacitor – if
we wait a long time we can expect that even a small current will build up a
measurable charge. We take the observable indicator F (ρ) to be the current i0.
§4. Case 2: Measurements based on vanishing comparisons. Before
introducing a new experiment, we modify the Wheatstone bridge experiment
a little to change a signed comparison experiment into a vanishing comparison
experiment.
4.1. Wheatstone revisited. Let us suppose that we do not have a capacitor
to store charge for the Wheatstone bridge experiment in Section 3.3, or indeed
any method to directly measure the current. We could look for i0 = 0 by
measuring the heating effect due to the current — for example by putting a
resistance in a vacuum flask, and measuring the rise in temperature after a certain
time. The energy dissipated in the resistance is approximately proportional to
(%− ρ)2, so we have no knowledge of the sign of %− ρ. We take the observable
indicator F (ρ) to be the energy dissipated in the resistance.
This may seem a rather artificial example, as the problem is caused by choosing
a limit on the apparatus. But there is another case, where we see no obvious
way to find information on the sign — measuring Brewster’s angle.
4.2. Brewster’s angle. This is designed to measure a critical angle for re-
flecting a light beam from a boundary between two materials of different re-
fractive indexes, labeled mediums (1) and (2) in Figure 7. The construction of
this gedankenexperiment is based on the principles of classical optics (as main
reference we cite [21]). In Figure 7, we indicate the incident, reflected, and the
transmitted rays: φ, ϕ, and ψ are the angles of incidence, reflexion, and refrac-
tion. The plane of incidence is Oxz. The directions of propagation of the three
waves and the normal to the surface of separation of the two media are coplanar.
The electric fields of the three waves are ~EI = 〈EIx, EIy, EIz〉 for the incident
wave, ~ER = 〈ERx, ERy, ERz〉 for the reflected wave, and ~ET = 〈ETx, ETy, ETz〉
for the transmitted wave.
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In Figure 7, are also represented the components of the electrical field in the
plane of incidence EIP , ERP , ETP and in the perpendicular direction EIN ,
ERN , ETN , which is the direction Oy not appearing in the figure. We consider
a component of the reflected or transmitted rays to be positive (or negative)
whenever the correspondent ray, when rotated to coincide in direction with the
incident ray, gets the same direction (opposite direction).
(incident ray) (reflected ray)
(transmitted ray)
medium (1)
medium (2)
O
X
Z
~EIN ~ERN
~ETN
φ
ψ
ϕ
~EIP ~ERP
~ETP
Figure 7. Elements of incident, reflection, and transmitted light rays. The
indexes of the electrical field E denote the incident I , reflected R, and trans-
mitted T rays, together with the normal N and the parallel P components of
the field. The black circle denotes the normal component pointing forward and
the white circle denotes the normal component pointing backwards.
Optics provide the following subset of relations, called the Fresnel general
formulæ for the components of the electrical field:
ERN = −EIN sin(φ− ψ)
sin(φ+ ψ)
, ERP = +EIP
tan(φ− ψ)
tan(φ+ ψ)
ETN = +EIN
2 sinψ cosφ
sin(φ+ ψ)
, ETP = +EIP
2 sinψ cosφ
sin(φ+ ψ) cos(φ− ψ)
From the Fresnel formulæ, we get immediately the law of Brewster: For some
value of the angle of incidence φB, the reflected light is totally polarized in the
direction normal to the plane of incidence. For this particular angle φB , we have
ERP = 0 and ERN 6= 0: the reflected light has only the normal component ERN .
Now, suppose that the incident light wave is polarized in the plane of incidence
and the angle of incidence is φB : the reflected ray extinguishes.
In finding the Brewster angle in Optics, that the angle of incidence is above
or below the critical Brewster angle cannot be known using properties of light.
For incident polarized light, when φ = φB , the reflected ray vanishes (see Figure
7). We only know that the light becomes fainter near the critical value to be
measured. We measure the intensity by integrating over a given time. (Quantum
theory makes this a little easier in practice — we can count photons hitting a
detector in a given time.) We take the observable indicator F (φ) to be the
intensity of the reflected ray.
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Now the diligent reader will return to the Fresnel formulæ, note that in fact
there is a 180◦ phase change from one side of φB to the other, and ask why we
do not measure this phase change. After all, the standard way to measure a
180◦ phase change is to measure the cancellation effect when combined with a
reference wave of similar amplitude. But that is the trouble, if the amplitudes
are not similar, the effect on phase shift will be small. And here the amplitude
of the wave that we are trying to measure is already very small and uncertain.
We have not been able to produce any practical measurement process that can
measure the phase shift.
§5. Case 3: Measurements based on threshold comparisons.
5.1. A broken balance. The simplest experiment we can have to illustrate
this is the broken balance, Figure 8:
a x
Rigid block
O
h
Figure 8. Schematic representation of the broken balance.
If weights x < a then the left side of the balance will move down. However
if a < x the balance will not move, as the wooden block under the right side
prevents it moving down. We take the observable indicator F (a) to be the angle
of the balance arm with the horizontal. However, since everyone will think this is
too simple to be interesting, we will move to one of the most famous experiments
in history.
5.2. The photoelectric effect. Figure 9 illustrates the measurement of the
photoelectric effect (discovered by Lenard 1902), whose results were explained
by Einstein in 1905 in terms of quanta. Electrons are knocked out of the surface
by the light. Measure the current given by the electrons between the surface and
the grid, as the potential on the grid is changed. Beyond a certain voltage, all
the electrons are repelled by the charge on the grid, and no current is observed.
We wish to find this critical voltage, and so measure the maximum energy the
electrons leave the surface with. We take the observable indicator F (V ) to be
the current flowing as a function of the grid voltage V .
- - - -
f1
e−
metallic surface
electron detector
Figure 9. Schematic description of the Photoelectric Effect Experiment.
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5.3. Rutherford scattering. For our third experiment we return to the
collider machine for comparing a test mass m with an unknown mass µ, as given
in Section 3.2. The reader will recall that there the particles collided head on,
and that the collision was perfectly elastic. We shall remove the head on part of
the collision (i.e., the initial velocity need not be on the line joining the centres of
the particles), and introduce a well understood field, an inverse square repulsion,
and see how the experiment differs. This experiment looks like the experiment
scattering a beam of alpha particles from a gold foil (Geiger and Marsden 1909).
The result of this experiment was that a few alpha particles were scattered back
in the direction they had come from. This was explained by Rutherford as
scattering of the alpha particles off small but relatively heavy (compared to an
alpha particle) atomic nuclei.
We shall take a target consisting of “nuclei” of mass µ, and scatter a beam
of test particles of mass m from the target. The interaction is by a repul-
sive Coulombian field, for example the particles can have the same sign electric
charge. We shall study the distribution of scattered angle as the test mass
varies. We shall assume that effectively the only forces involved are the repul-
sive Coulomb interaction, and in particular that any forces holding the target
particle fixed are negligible in comparison.
X
Z
0◦
270◦
180◦
90◦
impinging beam
n particles per second
detector
scattered particles
unscattered particles
θ′
struck particles
Figure 10. Scattering machine experiment. The detector has a non-
negligible area and rotates around the block of matter.
The input value we have no effective control over is the impact parameter b,
which is the distance by which the particles would miss each other if there was
no interaction. The values of this parameter are so small that we can only deal
in probabilities, there is no aiming the experiment for a particular value. A large
value of b means that the particles do not come close, and that the scattering
angle θ′ is small, whereas a small b gives a large θ′ (see Figure 10).
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To describe the results of this experiment, we refer to the usual notation of
scattering theory (see [20]). Recalling that the target is so small that the actual
line of approach of the incident particle relative to the target (the “impact pa-
rameter” mentioned earlier) is random, we measure areas as a way of measuring
the probability of the particle being scattered by a given angle θ′ in Figure 10.
The area is measured where the particle would hit a plane perpendicular to the
direction of the incident beam in the absence of a deflecting force (i.e., in Figure
10 we could use the plane of the front of the target material). The reader may
recall that to be deflected by a large angle, the incident particle must pass close
to the target particle. The cross section S(θ) is defined to be the area on this
plane for which the particle is deflected by an angle of magnitude greater than
θ, i.e. where |θ′| > θ in Figure 10. The differential cross section χ(θ) is then just
χ(θ) =
∣∣∣dS
dθ
∣∣∣ .
X
Z
0◦
270◦
180◦
90◦
center
of mass
impinging beam
n particles per second struck particle with
unknown mass µ
firing particle with
dyadic mass m
θˆ
Figure 11. Elements of trajectory of an electric particle in a Coulombian field.
The book [20] gives the differential cross section for the Coulomb scattering
problem for a fixed central charge with potential qµqm/r, where r is the distance
between the particles;
χ(θˆ) =
pi(qµqm)
2
4Eˆ2
cos(θˆ/2)
sin3(θˆ/2)
,(2)
where qµ and qm are the electric charges of the struck and projected particles,
respectively, and Eˆ is the kinetic energy of each particle of the beam. However
this is derived on the assumption that the central charge remains fixed, which
may be a reasonable approximation for alpha particles striking gold nuclei, but
not where we use similar particles of similar mass. However the mechanics can
be considerably simplified by moving to a reference frame with origin the centre
of mass of the two particles, as shown in Figure 11.
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The simplifying feature about the two body problem is that, when viewed in
the centre of mass frame, each particle describes a trajectory as if there were
only a single fixed charge at the centre of mass. The cost is that some of the
parameters (Eˆ) in the equations have to be changed, and that the angles in the
centre of mass frame (θˆ) are not the same as those in the laboratory frame, where
the particle of mass µ is initially stationary.
We wish to measure the particles scattered back along their direction of ap-
proach, which means θ ∈ [pi2 , pi]. A quick check shows that in the laboratory
frame, the incoming particle is never scattered back if m > µ. If m ≤ µ,
in the centre of mass frame back scattering corresponds to the interval θˆ ∈
[arccos(−m/µ), pi], and integrating Equation (2) gives
back scatter cross section =
pi(qµqm)
2
4Eˆ2
(
1− 1
sin2(θˇ/2)
)
,
where θˇ = arccos(−m/µ). Substituting for this angle gives
back scatter cross section =
pi(qµqm)
2
4Eˆ2
m− µ
m+ µ
.
The centre of mass energy Eˆ of the particle m is, in terms of the laboratory
frame energy E,
Eˆ = E
(
1 +
m
µ
)2
.
Using the fact that we will be operating in the region where m is approximately
equal to µ, we have the approximation for m ≤ µ,
back scatter cross section ' pi (qµqm)
2 (m− µ)
128µE2
.(3)
We take the observable indicator F (m) to be the back scatter cross section,
as measured by counting number of particles scattered backwards. If we now
conduct an experiment to measure µ by looking for back scattering of particles
of determined mass m, we see that we have no back scattering for m ≥ µ. We
can determine if m < µ, but to do so takes a time inversely proportional to
|m− µ|. This is because only the number of particles striking the area given in
(3) will be back scattered, and this number is inversely proportional to |m− µ|.
§6. Algorithmic nature of the three types of measurement. We now
make explicit the general forms of the algorithms that govern the three types of
measurement. These will make clear experimental differences due to the restric-
tion in the sort of comparisons allowed, as given in cases (1), (2) and (3).2
Suppose we are to determine a value x of a physical quantity, which is a real
number in the range x ∈ (0, 1). Assume there is a pre-set error  within which we
wish to determine x. In each case, we use a method of trial and error, comparing
the unknown x to a known quantity a ∈ [0, 1]. In each case, the output of the
algorithm is an interval [a1, a2] containing x, where |a2 − a1| < .
2Here we are not interested in the total time taken to find x to a given accuracy, nor in any
errors inherent in the procedure, but only in the algorithm used. The time taken and dealing
with errors can be found in other places [12, 13, 14].
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For mathematical convenience we take only dyadic rational values of a and,
referring back to Figure 3, we suppose that x is the point where the function
F (a) vanishes (in case (3), the first point where F (a) vanishes).
In two of the cases noted below, the Brewster’s angle measurement and the
Rutherford scattering experiment, the reader may note that the process of parti-
cle counting is in fact probabilistic. This is not vital to the point we are making,
and we will simply ignore this probabilistic nature, assuming that the particles
arrive at ‘on average’ times. In both cases, given assumptions on the model of
physics, we could calculate time limits for each experiment to give a bound for
the error due to probabilistic reasons of the whole experiment of, say, 14 . From
there, repetition of the whole procedure can further reduce the error probability
to any desired (strictly positive) amount. To see results which take this sort of
probability of error into account, see [13, 16].
6.1. Case 1: Signed comparisons. Here the algorithm is a basic linear
search method. We assume that the observable indicator F (a) is strictly positive
on [0, x) and strictly negative on (x, 1].
Basic linear search algorithm
Set a1 = 0, a2 = 1.
Loop:
Let a = (a1 + a2)/2.
If F (a) > 0 set a1 = a.
If F (a) < 0 set a2 = a.
If F (a) = 0 set a1 = a and a2 = a.
If |a2 − a1| < , then HALT.
To see how to implement this for the collider, where F (a) is the speed of test
mass a after the interaction, we wait until the test mass passes the flag P+ in
Figure 5 (in which case m > µ and F (a) > 0) or it passes the flag P− (in
which case m < µ and F (a) < 0). Of course, if we impose a time limit on the
experiment, we may get neither result. However, in this last case, we get an out
of time result. Thus, this method is quite robust algorithmically — if it goes
wrong, it produces an exception or error message. Further, an out of time result
means that |m− µ| must be small, so there is useful information to be obtained
from it.
6.2. Case 2: Vanishing comparisons. Here a simple bisection method
will not work. There is no single measurement to determine whether a > x or
a < x. We assume that the observable indicator F (a) is decreasing on [0, x] and
increasing on [x, 1].
Modified linear search algorithm
Set a1 = 0, a2 = 1.
Loop:
Let a = (3 a1 + a2)/4 and b = (a1 + 3 a2)/4.
If F (a) > F (b) set a1 = a.
If F (a) < F (b) set a2 = b.
If F (a) = F (b) set a1 = a and a2 = b.
If |a2 − a1| < , the HALT.
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To see how to implement this for the Brewster’s angle measurement, we count
photons for the different angles a and b over a given time. If we cannot decide
either F (a) > F (b) or F (a) < F (b) in the given time, we return out of time.
However, this is not a very useful result in itself, as it does not imply that x
is close to either a or b. The values of a and b can be changed a bit, and the
experiment repeated.
6.3. Case 3: Threshold comparisons. At first sight the algorithm here is
very similar to the basic linear search method for Case (1). We assume that the
observable indicator F (a) is strictly positive on [0, x) and zero on [x, 1].
Modified linear search algorithm
Set a1 = 0, a2 = 1.
Loop:
Let a = (a1 + a2)/2.
If F (a) > 0 set a1 = a, otherwise set a2 = a.
If |a2 − a1| < , then HALT.
To see how to implement this for the Rutherford scattering experiment, we
count back scattered particles within a certain time limit. If we observe any back
scattered particles, then m < µ. And now we come to the difference between
this case (3) and case (1) — this method is much less robust. We may not have
observed any particles because we did not allow enough time to observe any.
In that case we could wrongly assume that F (a) > 0 is false, and wrongly set
a2 = a in the algorithm above.
In case (1), the out of time result indicated that there was a problem with the
experiment. In this case (3), out of time is a valid result of the experiment, which
can be expected for a large proportion of the time. It can arise either because
a ≥ x (which is not a problem), or a < x but we did not observe the system
for long enough to find this out (which is a problem). To get any reliability, we
need to look at the physical theory behind the experiment, in order to see how
fast the value to be measured F (a)→ 0 as a→ x from below.
(a) (b)
Figure 12. Threshold: A good case (a) and a bad case (b)
In Figure 12 we have a good case and a bad case for our algorithm. In (a)
we know how fast the function F (a) decreases as a → x from below – it is a
straight line, though the exact formula is not important. In (b) we will not say
anything about how fast the rate of decrease is, and as a result it is very difficult
to see where the curve meets the axis. The finite thickness of the lines in the
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pictures may be taken as illustrating the accuracy of the experiment at a given
time limit!
It is however possible to abandon the linear search method entirely, and replace
it with a one sided method which will always work. By a finite search procedure,
let an be the largest dyadic rational in [0, 1] with denominator 2
n for which we
can show F (an) > 0 in experimental time 2
n. Then an is an increasing sequence
which tends to x.
§7. General algorithmic theory of measurement. In our computational
theory of measurement, we combine experiments and algorithms by using the
experiments as oracles. We will describe very briefly the general ideas about
physical oracles used to answer questions about measurement in Section 1.
7.1. Physical oracles. In the classical model of a Turing machine with an
oracle, the oracle is an external device that is consulted by the machine. The or-
acle may contain non-computable information to boost the computational power
of the Turing machine, or computable information provided to speed up com-
putations of the Turing machine. In computability theory, the oracle is a set of
strings over an alphabet and the Turing machine accesses the oracle via queries
that take one computational step to answer.
In our computational theory of measurement, we model the apparatus for
measuring a physical quantity in detail using a precisely defined physical theory.
This mathematical model of the behaviour of the apparatus allows us to describe
observations in time from given initial states. The algorithm running the Turing
machine abstracts the experimental procedure for the measurement chosen by the
experimenter: it encodes the sequence of actions that determine the initialisation
and observation.
Typically, to measure the value of a physical quantity is to construct a real
number µ bit-by-bit. Real numbers belong in measurement theory as they are
an abstract mathematical realisation of the idea of measuring with rationals
with unlimited precision (see, e.g., [26]). The Turing machine follows a proce-
dure that generates a sequence of approximate measurements corresponding with
oracle consultations. Ideally, the algorithm conducting the experiment should
approximate the unknown µ both from above and from below, in a convergent
sequence of experimental values. The algorithm to measure µ could be one of
those in Section 6. Indeed, the signed comparison algorithm has been proved to
be universal in specific settings (see [13] for one such universal algorithm).
The equipment and the algorithm exchanges data through an interface. We
use dyadic rationals, which are trivially denoted by finite binary strings, the data
type of the Turing machine. A query initiates a run of the equipment. The query
can contain data about test values and precision. We have found that the query
time depends upon the size of the query data. Indeed commonly, the time taken
to return an observation is exponential in the query size. See [13] for the first
complete case study in which the time needed for a single experiment to read
the bit i of a mass µ, using the proof particle of mass m of size i (=number of
bits) is in the best case exponential in i.
Roughly speaking, the model allows us to have a discrete-time description of
the scientist’s activity and continuous-time analysis of the physical phenomenon
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being measured (which is described in the physical theory by differential equa-
tions, typically). The communication between scientist and apparatus is done
via a protocol and has a cost in time that is not an artificial mathematical com-
plexity constraint, but is a consequence of the physical oracle belonging the real
world. The cost of the oracle was analysed in previous papers, such as [5, 14, 13],
where the computational classes of the overall setting Turing machine and analog
device were studied, for different oracle costs. In [17], we addressed the question
whether different physical models of the experimental apparatus influences the
cost of the oracle.
The basic structure of physical oracle, interface and Turing machine is depicted
in Figure 13.
Physical theory T Interface axioms I
Equipment:
– Physical system
– Device
– Machine
– ...
Interface:
– Queries
– Answers
– Precision
– Timing
– Stability
– ...
Procedure:
– Turing machine
– Resource constraints
– ...
Boosts computation
Figure 13. An experiment as oracle.
7.2. Oracles boost computation. In classical computability theory, Emil
Post established the idea that an oracle is a set A and a query is a question of
the form is a ∈ A? that is answered after a single time step. If the oracle to
a Turing machine is a physical measurement, then the time needed to consult
the oracle is a number of time steps that will depend on the size of the query.
Thus, a primary difference between classical oracles and physical oracles is the
need for a cost function T , e.g., a timer that counts the number T (k) of time
steps the Turing machine must wait as a function of the size of the query k.
Provided with such mathematical constructions, the main complexity classes of
Turing machines coupled with these measurements, e.g., for the polynomial time
case, change and need to be studied (see [5, 8]). Interesting classes emerge,
namely those involved in the study of the complexity of hybrid systems and
analogue-digital systems such as mirror systems and neural nets (see [22, 30]).
In the physical world, it is not conceivable that an experiment can be initialised
with infinite precision. If we consider that precision is not infinite but unbounded,
i.e., as big as we need, then it does affect the measurement. Essentially the same
complexity classes are defined (see [16]), respectively P/ log? for the infinite
precision case and BPP// log? for the unbounded precision case. But suppose
that we reject unbounded precision in favour of the most common and realistic a
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priori fixed precision criterion. Then we proved in [5, 13] that, using stochastic
methods, we are still able to read the bits of µ. To make our claim rigorous, we
say that the lack of precision in measurement, for some types of error distribution,
will not constitute an obstacle to the reading of the bits of µ, but only in the
case that the bits of µ are readable (!) (see [13]).
The proofs involving lower bounds of time complexity were conducted by en-
coding advice functions in the unknown quantities to be measured and allowing
measurement with errors.
The axiomatic approach generalises the methods of [5, 13] for the signed case.
In [16], we proved the following theorems as to how computable and complex are
measurements by the three different types of precision in the signed case:
Theorem 2. The power of Turing machines equipped with signed comparison
oracles with infinite precision, in polynomial time, is P/ log?.
Theorem 3. The power of Turing machines equipped with signed comparison
oracles with unbounded or fixed finite precision in polynomial time is BPP// log?.
7.3. Algorithms control experiments. Finally, in our measurement the-
ory, instead of thinking of the physical oracle boosting the Turing machine, we
think of the Turing machine controlling the physical oracle. The Turing machine
imposes limitations to what is effectively accessible to physical observation. For
example, some reasonable definitions of measurable number (as in [13]) imply
that not all masses are measurable. This is not due to the limitations in mea-
surements where experimental errors occur (as we address in the subsection
above) nor is it because quantum phenomena puts a limit to measurements.
It is because of a more essential symbolic and logical limitation of conceiving
and modelling physicists and experimental procedures as Turing machines. The
mathematics of computation theory does not allow the reading of bits of physi-
cal quantities beyond a certain limit: even if infinite precision instruments were
available to the algorithmic experimenter, it could not always do the job for
physical-mathematical reasons.
The idea of measurable numbers was first considered by Geroch and Hartle
in [25], where they introduce the concept in contrast to a computable number.
Geroch and Hartle examined at length some desiderata for a theory of measurable
numbers. Our theoretical approach provides a mathematical home for several of
their speculative ideas. However, the results of our theory do not match with
Geroch and Hartle’s expectations and speculations: some Geroch and Hartle’s
measurable numbers become non-measurable in our setting and some of their
non-measurable numbers become measurable.
But, either in Geroch and Hartle’s setting or in ours, the concept of com-
putable number, introduced by Turing in [33], is not to be confused with the
concept of measurable number. Indeed, we showed in [19, 13] that algorithms
applied to physical systems can extract non-computable numbers and, vice-versa,
some computable numbers cannot be measured; and, moreover, there are lim-
its to measurement in physical systems which arise, not from the limitations of
the experimental apparatus, but from the limits of computations performed in
algorithmic measurement.
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§8. Axioms and algorithms. We will now give three axiomatic specifica-
tions of the interface between apparatus and algorithm for signed, vanishing and
threshold experiments. Each interface defines a very general class E(G) of ex-
periments measuring a physical quantity x that can reasonably act as physical
oracles to an algorithm.
For each of the three cases, we first present axioms for an interface. Then
we justify the axioms in terms of the behaviour of our hypothetical form of
apparatus, set up to make measurements on the physical quantity using the
observable indicator F . Essentially an experiment with the given behaviour
can be used to make a physical oracle: a certification lemma provides sufficient
conditions for an experiment to satisfy the axioms and hence to act as an oracle.
Finally, we give an algorithm which could be used by a Turing machine, equipped
with an interface and physical oracle satisfying the axioms, which can be used
to find the quantity x within an arbitrarily small error.
The algorithms need only a very abstract interface to operate with the ap-
paratus. For example, while the certification lemmas involve the observable
indicators of the experiments, the interfaces do not.
In any experiment, the test value a is generated by a query containing a
rational number y of a special form. In general, the equipment could introduce
an error so that a is close to y but not identical. This error may be adjustable
or fixed. For simplicity, we suppose that there is no error and a = y as our main
concern is to illustrate the types of measurement. To see what happens in error
prone cases, the reader can look elsewhere [5, 8]. Furthermore, we suppose that
there is no error in our observations, that is, if we make a query with number
y, and the experimentally observed result is F (y) > 0, then it really is true that
F (y) > 0. (However, if F (y) > 0 is small, we may not be able to observe that
F (y) > 0 in a given time.)
One of the interface’s main properties is a set G of functions on the natural
numbers that bound the time taken to initialise and run the equipment, make
an observation and return data to the algorithm; thus, G is a class of functions
of the form g : N → N. Many examples, including those in this paper, have led
us to distinguish the following class of time bounds:
ExpLin = {g : N→ N | 2an+b ≤ g(n) ≤ 2cn+d}.
In the time bound for the algorithms, p(n) is a polynomial which is indepen-
dent of the choice of g ∈ G. It is a bound on the time used by the Turing machine
to execute the algorithm, not counting the waiting time for the physical oracle.
8.1. Axioms and algorithms for the signed case. The axioms for the
signed case
1. Real values. The experiment is designed to find a physical parameter x ∈
(0, 1).
2. Queries. Each query string is interpreted as a binary string of 0s and 1s,
y1y2 . . . yk, giving a dyadic rational y = 0·y1y2 . . . yk.
3. Finite output. The result is either y < x or y > x (correctly assigned) or
time out.
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4. Protocol timer. There is a g ∈ G so that the time taken for the query is g(k),
where k is the length of the query.
5. Sufficiency of the protocol. If |x − y| > 2−k, then the result is either y < x
or y > x. That is, k determines the error margin in separating x and y.
6. Repeatability. Identical queries will result in identical results.
The justification for the signed case axioms
In this case the observable indicator F (y) > 0 for y < x and F (y) < 0 for
y > x (the other way round would be similar). We have the following result which
allows us to implement the axioms, given an experimental apparatus satisfying
certain conditions:
Lemma 1. Certification lemma: Suppose that there is an experimental
setup and a g ∈ G so that:
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [0, x − 2−n], we can experimentally observe F (y) > 0 in
time g(n).
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [x + 2−n, 1], we can experimentally observe F (y) < 0 in
time g(n).
Then we can use the experimental setup to construct a physical oracle satisfying
the signed axioms.
Proof. Given y = 0 ·y1y2 . . . yk, perform the experiment to measure F (y)
for time g(k). If we measure F (y) > 0, then output “y < x”. If we measure
F (y) < 0, then output “y > x”. If neither, output time out. 
The algorithm for the signed case
Proposition 1. Given a Turing machine with a physical oracle satisfying
the axioms for the signed case for x ∈ (0, 1) and g ∈ G, there is an algorithm
to find an ∈ [0, 1) for integer n ≥ 0 whose binary expansion has at most n + 1
significant figures, and so that an < x ≤ an + 1/2n. The time taken by this
algorithm to find an is
p(n) +
n+1∑
i=2
g(i) ,
where p(n) is independent of x and g, and is the time taken to run the algorithm
on the Turing machine, not counting wait times for the physical oracle.
Proof. This sequence is constructed recursively via oracle calls in the fol-
lowing manner: Begin with a0 = 0. Now suppose that we have constructed an.
Make one call to the oracle with a length k = n+ 2 string, with y = an + 2
−n−1.
There are three outcomes:
i) If the query gives time out, set an+1 = an + 2
−n−2.
ii) If the query gives y < x, set an+1 = an + 2
−n−1.
iii) If the query gives x < y, set an+1 = an.
To see that this works, note that by Axiom 5, if we make a query y of length
k = n + 2, and the result is time out, then y + 2−n−2 > x > y − 2−n−2. Cases
(ii) and (iii) are self-explanatory once the relevant value of y is plugged in. 
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8.2. Axioms and algorithms for the vanishing case. The axioms for
the vanishing case
1. Real values. The experiment is designed to find a physical parameter x ∈
(0, 1).
2. Queries. Each query string is interpreted as a binary string of 0s and 1s,
y1y2 . . . yk, giving a dyadic rational y = 0·y1y2 . . . yk.
3. Finite output. The result is either y < x or x < y+ 2−k (correctly assigned)
or time out.
4. Protocol timer. There is a g ∈ G so that the time taken for the query is g(k),
where k is the length of the query.
5. Sufficiency of the protocol. If x ≤ y, then the result is x < y + 2−k, and if
y + 2−k ≤ x then the result is y < x.
6. Repeatability. Identical queries will result in identical results.
The justification for the vanishing case axioms
In this case F : [0, x] → R is strictly decreasing, F : [x, 1] → R is strictly
increasing, and F (x) = 0. We have the following result which allows us to imple-
ment the axioms, given an experimental apparatus satisfying certain conditions:
Lemma 2. Certification lemma: Suppose that there is an experimental
setup and a g ∈ G so that:
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [0, x − 2−n], we can observe F (y + 2−n) < F (y) in time
g(n).
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [x, 1 − 2−n], we can observe F (y + 2−n) > F (y) in time
g(n).
Then we can use the experimental setup to construct a physical oracle satisfying
the vanishing axioms.
Proof. Given y = 0 ·y1y2 . . . yk, first check if y > 1 − 2−k, in which case
output “x < y + 2−k”. Otherwise perform the experiment to compare F (y)
and F (y + 2−k) for time g(k). If we measure F (y + 2−k) > F (y), then output
“x < y + 2−k”. If we measure F (y + 2−k) < F (y), then output “y < x”. If
neither, output time out.
We have four cases for the value of y:
First, y ∈ [x, 1 − 2−k], in which case we observe F (y + 2−n) > F (y), and
correctly output “x < y+2−k”. Second, y ∈ [0, x−2−k], in which case we observe
F (y + 2−k) < F (y), and correctly output “y < x”. Third, y ∈ (x − 2−k, x), in
which case we can correctly return any output. Fourth, y > 1 − 2−k, in which
case the output is correctly “x < y + 2−k”. 
The algorithm for the vanishing case
Proposition 2. Given a Turing machine with a physical oracle satisfying
the axioms for the vanishing case for x ∈ (0, 1) and g ∈ G, there is an algorithm
to find an ∈ [0, 1) for integer n ≥ 0 whose binary expansion has at most n + 1
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significant figures, and so that an < x ≤ an + 1/2n. The time taken by this
algorithm to find an is
p(n) + 2
n+1∑
i=2
g(i) ,
where p(n) is independent of x and g, and is the time taken to run the algorithm
on the Turing machine, not counting wait times for the physical oracle.
Proof. This sequence is constructed recursively via oracle calls in the follow-
ing manner: Begin with a0 = 0. Now suppose that we have constructed an. Make
two calls to the oracle with length k = n + 2 strings, one with y = an + 2
−n−2
and the other with y = an + 2
−n−1. There are four outcomes, taken in order:
i) If either of the queries gives time out, set an+1 = an + 2
−n−2.
ii) If the result of the second query is y < x, set an+1 = an + 2
−n−1.
iii) If the result of the first query is x < y + 2−k, set an+1 = an.
iv) Otherwise, set an+1 = an + 2
−n−2.
To see that this works, note that by Axiom 5, if we make a query y of length
k = n+2, and the result is time out, then y+2−n−2 > x > y. Cases (ii) and (iii)
are self-explanatory once the relevant value of y is plugged in. If none of (i-iii)
apply, then we must have the results y < x from the first query and x < y+ 2−k
from the second. 
8.3. Axioms and algorithms for the threshold case. The axioms for
the threshold case
1. Real values. The experiment is designed to find a physical parameter x ∈
(0, 1).
2. Queries. Each query string is interpreted as a binary string of 0s and 1s,
y1y2 . . . yk, giving a dyadic rational y = 0·y1y2 . . . yk.
3. Finite output. The result is either y < x (correctly assigned) or time out.
4. Protocol timer. There is a g ∈ G so that the time taken for the query is g(k),
where k is the length of the query.
5. Sufficiency of the protocol. If y < x− 2−k, then the result is y < x.
6. Repeatability. Identical queries will result in identical results.
The justification for the threshold case axioms
In this case F (y) > 0 for y < x, and F (y) = 0 for y ≥ x. We have the
following result which allows us to implement the axioms, given an experimental
apparatus satisfying certain conditions:
Lemma 3. Certification lemma: Suppose that there is an experimental
setup and a g ∈ G so that:
For all n ≥ 1, if y < x− 2−n, we can observe F (y) > 0 in time g(n).
Then we can use the experimental setup to construct a physical oracle satisfying
the threshold axioms.
Proof. Given y = 0 ·y1y2 . . . yk, , perform the experiment to measure F (y)
for time g(k). If we measure F (y) > 0, then output “y < x”. Otherwise, output
time out. 
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The algorithm for the threshold
Proposition 3. Given a Turing machine with a physical oracle satisfying
the axioms for the threshold case for x ∈ (0, 1) and g ∈ G, there is an algorithm
to find an ∈ [0, 1) for integer n ≥ 0 whose binary expansion has at most n + 1
significant figures, and so that an < x ≤ an + 1/2n. The time taken by this
algorithm to find an is
p(n) + 2
n+1∑
i=2
g(i) ,
where p(n) is independent of x and g, and is the time taken to run the algorithm
on the Turing machine, not counting wait times for the physical oracle.
Proof. This sequence is constructed recursively via oracle calls in the fol-
lowing manner: Begin with a0 = 0. Now suppose that we have constructed an.
Make two calls to the oracle with length k = n+ 2 strings, corresponding to the
numbers y = an + 2
−n−2 and y = an + 2−n−1. We have three cases:
i) If the query an + 2
−n−2 gives time out, then set an+1 = an.
ii) If the query an+2
−n−2 gives an+2−n−2 < x and the query an+2−n−1 gives
time out, then set an+1 = an + 2
−n−2.
iii) If the query an + 2
−n−2 gives an + 2−n−2 < and the query an + 2−n−1 gives
an + 2
−n−1 < x, then set an+1 = an + 2−n−1.
To see that this works, note that by 5, if we make a query y of length k =
n + 2, and the result is time out, then x ≤ y + 2−n−2. Now in case (i), we get
an < x ≤ an+2−n−1. In case (ii), we get an+2−n−2 < x ≤ an+2−n−1 +2−n−2.
In case (iii), we get an + 2
−n−1 < x ≤ an + 2−n. 
§9. Experimental times, errors, and the axioms. From the paper [18]
we have the following result:
Theorem 4. Suppose we are given an experimental procedure to measure
x ∈ (0, 1) in the following manner. Suppose there are rationals A,B,E > 0 and
integers n, q, p ≥ 1 so that
(a) Given y = 0 ·y1y2 . . . yk we can set up the experiment with a test value
y′ ∈ R with |y − y′| < 2−s in time 2p max{s,k}E.
(b) We can run the experiment to determine if x < y′ or x > y′ in time
A
|x− y′|q ≤ Texperiment(x, y
′) ≤ B|x− y′|n .
Then there is a physical oracle to a Turing machine using the experiment which
obeys the axioms 8.1 for the signed case, with G = ExpLin.
The proof of this result, where an error prone experiment ends up giving
invariably correct results, depends on hiding the error in the output category
time out. (The possibility of error could also be written into the axioms, of
course, but they would be different axioms.)
However, in this paper our purpose is to explain the indicator function and
the different sorts of experiments, so we shall ignore errors in what follows.
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We shall however take the experimental time bound in Theorem 4 as typical
of ‘realistic’ thought experiments. In this paper we measure x by observing
the indicator function F (y). We shall suppose that determining a difference
F (y1) > F (y2) takes an experimental time bounded by, for constants A,B, q, n,
A
|F (y1)− F (y2)|q ≤ Texperiment(y1, y2) ≤
B
|F (y1)− F (y2)|n .(4)
In fact (4) is too specialised and complicated for our needs. If we take δ to be
the change in F that we need to observe, let T (δ) be an upper bound on the time
needed to observe it. Thus, for example, (4) gives T (δ) = B/δn. Now analysing
the various cases requires examining the graph of F , so the reader should look
at Figure 3 again.
9.1. The signed case. Recall Certification Lemma 1. Suppose that there
are numbers δn > 0 so that
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [0, x− 2−n], then F (y) ≥ δn.
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [x+ 2−n, 1], then F (y) ≤ −δn.
To distinguish these numbers F (y) from 0 could be done in time T (δn), so the
conditions for certification Lemma 1 are true if T (δn) ≤ g(n). The condition on
δn can be restated as
0 < δn ≤ min{|F (y)| : y ∈ [0, x− 2−n] ∪ [x+ 2−n, 1]}
9.2. The vanishing case. Recall Certification Lemma 2. Suppose that there
are numbers δn > 0 so that
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [x, 1− 2−n], then F (y + 2−n)− F (y) ≥ δn.
For all n ≥ 1, if y ∈ [0, x− 2−n], then F (y)− F (y + 2−n) ≥ δn.
To distinguish these numbers from 0 could be done in time T (δn), so the
conditions for certification Lemma 2 are true if T (δn) ≤ g(n). The condition on
δn can be restated as
0 < δn ≤ min{|F (y + 2−n)− F (y)| : y ∈ [x, 1− 2−n] ∪ [0, x− 2−n]}
9.3. The threshold case. Recall Certification Lemma 3. Suppose that there
are numbers δn > 0 so that
For all n ≥ 1, if y < x− 2−n, then F (y) ≥ δn.
To distinguish these numbers from 0 could be done in time T (δn), so the
conditions for certification Lemma 3 are true if T (δn) ≤ g(n). The condition on
δn can be restated as
0 < δn ≤ min{|F (y)| : y ∈ [0, x− 2−n]} .
§10. The computational power of the physical oracles. In this section,
we will examine the computational power of a Turing machine using a physical
oracle governed by the axioms given in the three cases of Section 8. The com-
putational power is measured by non-uniform complexity theory, and as this has
been summarised elsewhere (see [2, 4]), we give only a short account.
THREE FORMS OF PHYSICAL MEASUREMENT AND THEIR COMPUTABILITY 25
10.1. Non-uniform computability and complexity. Traditionally com-
putability theory is phrased in terms of a word acceptance problem — a word
w in a certain alphabet is input to a Turing machine, and the word is either ac-
cepted, or the computation does not terminate. The idea is to consider the class
of words which are accepted by a certain machine in a certain time, expressed
as a function of the word length. Thus, a particular word acceptance problem is
deemed to be in the class P if there is a Turing machine M and a polynomial p
so that, when given a word w as an input, M accepts w (assuming that w is an
acceptable word) in a time p(|w|), where |w| is the length of the word w.
In particular, a word recognition problem in P is computable by a Turing
machine. The idea of non-uniform complexity is to go beyond such computable
problems, but in a controlled manner. This time, we use a function f , called
an advice function, from the natural numbers to words. Given a word w, we
take the word
〈
w, f(|w|)〉 given by appending f(|w|) to w (in fact we need to
be slightly careful about how to do this, so that we can see where w ends and
f(|w|) begins, but that is a technicality). We can now ask if the collection of〈
w, f(|w|)〉, that is words plus their respective advice, is in class P .
If the length |f(n)| of the advice word f(n) is bounded by a+b log2(n), we say
that advice is logarithmic, and the resulting non-uniform class is termed P/ log.
If we ask that f(n) is the appropriate length initial segment of a single infinite
word, we get the class P/ log?.
10.2. Lower bounds on power. Using the same techniques as in [13] (this
was the signed case in our current notation), mutatis mutandis, the algorithms in
Section 8 allow us to prove Theorem 5. Note that the signed case of this theorem
is proved in [5], and the threshold case in [9]. We only place a lower bound on
the computational power here, an upper bound requires further assumptions and
more complicated arguments. However, the lower bound is firmly outside the
purely Turing computable domain.
Theorem 5. Suppose that we are given a word acceptance problem in the
class P/ log?. Then there is a real number x ∈ (0, 1) so that a Turing machine
equipped with a physical oracle satisfying any of the axioms for
a) the signed case (Subsection 8.1) for x ∈ (0, 1) and G = ExpLin,
b) the vanishing case (Subsection 8.2) for x ∈ (0, 1) and G = ExpLin,
c) the threshold case (Subsection 8.3) for x ∈ (0, 1) and G = ExpLin,
can solve the problem in time polynomial in the word length.
Proof. We can give a proof that is uniform for the three cases. The real
x ∈ (0, 1) encodes the advice function for the P/ log? problem. The method of
encoding is described in detail in [5]. The alphabet is first coded as binary words,
so that without loss of generality we can take the alphabet to be {0, 1}. Next
the digits 0 and 1 in the infinite advice word are replaced by binary triplets. The
resulting binary word is used as the digits after the binary point in the binary
representation of a real x ∈ (0, 1). The triplets are chosen so that x lies in a
Cantor set with the following property: For any integer k and any integer m ≥ 1,
|x− k/2m| > 1/2m+5.
Now input a word w. Our first problem is to read a number a log2(|w|) + b of
binary digits from the expansion of x (we take n to be the integer value, rounded
26 EDWIN BEGGS, JOSE´ FE´LIX COSTA, AND JOHN V TUCKER
down, of a log2(|w|)+b). For this, we use the algorithms listed in Subsections 8.1,
8.2 and 8.3 for the respective cases.
These say that there is an algorithm to find an integer kn+5 (where an+5 =
kn+5/2
n+6) so that
kn+5
2n+6
< x ≤ kn+5
2n+6
+
1
2n+5
in a time bounded by
p(n+ 5) + 2
n+6∑
i=2
g(i) ,(5)
where p is a polynomial, and g ∈ ExpLin. Now |x− kn+52n+6 | < 1/2n+5, so there is
no number of the form k/2n, for integer k, between x and kn+52n+6 , so the first n
digits of x are the same as the first n digits of kn+52n+6 .
If we take a bound g(i) ≤ 2ci+d (with c, d > 0) for g ∈ ExpLin, then the time
bound from (5) has
p(n+ 5) + 2
n+6∑
i=2
g(i) ≤ p(n+ 5) + 2
n+6∑
i=2
2ci+d
≤ p(n+ 5) + 2 (n+ 5) 2cn+6c+d
≤ p(n+ 5) + 2 (n+ 5) 26c+d 2ac log2 |w|+bc
≤ p(n+ 5) + 2 (n+ 5) 26c+d+bc |w|ac .
As n ≤ a log2(|w|) + b we get a polynomial bound in the time taken for this
stage.
Now we can decode the first n digits of x to get the required advice f(|w|).
We append f(|w|) to the word w to get 〈w, f(|w|)〉, using a method which allows
a distinction to be made between the first and second parts. The most common
way of doing this doubles the length and adds two to the number of characters,
but this does not affect the result. Now the Turing machine runs the polynomial
time algorithm for the word
〈
w, f(|w|)〉 to get the result. 
§11. The interaction between physical theory and the axioms. The
axiomatic specifications in Section 8 make no mention of physical experiments.
The experimenters and their algorithms do not see any apparatus. It is as though
the two processes were in separate rooms: in one room is the experimental
apparatus, in another the Turing machine. Between them is a channel with an
interface defined by the axioms. Thus, the Turing machine sees the physical
oracle as a black box — given a query in a certain form, in a certain amount
of time given by g ∈ G, an answer of a certain form will be delivered. To the
experimentalists, in the design of their algorithms, the axiomatic specifications
are contracts that the apparatus may be expected to satisfy.
So how do the experimentalists know that their contract will be fulfilled? The
answer is that they don’t know, they cannot guarantee that the experiment will
behave exactly as the contract requires. What they do have is some physical
theory that predicts that the experiment behaves in such a way. In a quote from
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[1] which summarises commonly accepted ideas: “There is no measurement with-
out theory. Theory precedes measurement or, more properly, every measurement
implies theory.”
A look at our examples of experiments shows that to determine the physical
value we use a single observable, the observable indicator. The experiments
are arranged so that the observable indicator vanishes at the given physical
value, and we measure the value of the observable indicator at one or two values
specified by the input to the physical oracle. It is assumed that the time taken
to measure the observable indicator increases as the required accuracy of the
observation increases — this is certainly true of the given experiments. Then
the type of axiom required, and the class of functions G required, is determined
by the shape of the observable indicator as a function of the input parameter,
and the time taken to observe it to a given accuracy. The certification lemmas
are intended to bridge the gap.
How would we find that our theory was not capable of adequately modeling
the experiment? One way would be if the outputs from the physical oracle were
not consistent with the axioms — e.g., for the signed case we might have outputs
x > 12 and x <
1
4 . In principle, a Turing machine could carry out some limited
checking for such inconsistencies, but the algorithms listed in Section 8 do not
perform such checks.
A more subtle problem would be if the axioms did indeed perform as stated for
some value of x, but that value might not be the ‘expected’ value. For example,
most current theories of physics say that inertial and gravitational mass are the
same. In principle, cross referencing between two experiments, one measuring
inertial mass and the other gravitational mass, might discover an inconsistency.
However a single experiment might quite consistently measure the inertial mass,
whereas we expected the value of the gravitational mass, having erroneously
assumed that they were the same.
§12. Reflections. Finally, here are some comments on the nature of the
experiments and their taxonomy.
12.1. On classifying experiments. We are creating our theory of measure-
ment by exploring the algorithmic nature of the process of a scientist making a
measurement using an experimental procedure and some apparatus, and work-
ing within a scientific theory. The logical nature of measurement was analysed
by philosophers, using the methods of mathematical logic and was deeply inves-
tigated in the last century (see [23, 24, 26, 28, 32, 29])). In our approach, the
scientist is modelled as a Turing machine. Thus, the Turing machine represents
the discrete-time activity of the scientist; and the oracle, is an analog device
belonging to the continuous-time world where the measurement takes place. De-
tails of the model were given in Section 7.
Let us note that anthropic interpretations of the Turing machines originate
with Turing’s 1936 image of a human following a procedure to calculate with
symbols. The Church-Turing Thesis on the limits of computability rests most
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firmly on Turing’s anthropic argument. For us the machine models a scien-
tist measuring the value of a physical quantity. We believe that this idea has
tremendous scope.3
The axiomatic analysis in Section 2.1 from Measurement Theory encourages
us to think that the computational taxonomy of Section 2 is very general. We
believe that analysing case studies of experiments is vital to the construction of
the theory. However, describing a physical experiment can easily consume too
much space, a fact that motivates us to look at simple experiments which are
easy to specify and illuminate a property. In this paper, we have reinterpreted
and added experiments. For example, threshold measurements are distinct from
signed measurements and so are not covered by the theory we developed in previ-
ous papers such as [13, 14]. In particular, by including the modified Rutherford
experiment of Section 5.3, we wanted to emphasise that complex thought exper-
iments can be of the same type as simple experiments. We conjecture that the
threshold measurements have a canonical example in the broken beam balance.
The most simple experiments, which to a physicist may seem unacceptably sim-
ple and unworthy of discussion, are conceptually very rich.
Subsequently, we have analysed further the threshold oracles in [10] and the
vanishing oracles in [11].
12.2. On idealisations. We commonly encounter two reactions that express
caution towards the way we are developing our theory. The experiments we
use are simple — we have dealt with this reservation in subsection 12.1. The
experiments we use involve idealized apparatus that cannot be built — we will
address this now.
Although we have not helped our case by using the term gedankenexperiment
for many physical oracles, it is rather tiresome to have to point out repeatedly
that this reaction is a consequence of a diffuse and naive “philosophy” that
considers the Turing machine as an object of a different kind from a mathematical
model in physics. It is not. Both the abstract mathematical models of a physical
experiment and the Turing machine are entities of the same kind. For example,
they are equally non-realizable. For the implementation of the Turing machine an
engineer would need either unbounded space and an unlimited physical support
structure, or unbounded precision in some finite interval to code for the contents
of the tape; each time the size of the written word in the working tape increases
by one symbol, the precision needed will increase.4 The experiment can be set up
to some precision in the same way that the Turing machine can be implemented
up to some accuracy.
Knowing that both objects, the Turing machine and the measurement device,
are of the same ideal nature, we may now wonder what is the purpose of such
an experiment from the computational point of view. The physical experiment
exhibits the character of an oracle, an external device to the Turing machine.
It gives to the concept of an oracle a new epistemology, one close to Turing’s
description in 1939: the oracle is not any more a purely abstract mathematical
3In learning theory, the machine can model a human learning from a text, such as in [27].
4Note that, once the limits of miniaturization are attained, the only way to build unbounded
memories is by increasing the volume.
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entity, but an abstract physical entity; the oracle is not any more a one step
transition of the Turing machine, but a device that needs time to be consulted;
the oracle is not any more a relativisation mechanism, but it has physical content:
it can only be consulted up to some accuracy; moreover the degrees of accuracy
in the consultation of the oracle can be studied. For some, this setting can be
seen as that of a computer connected to an analogue device — a kind of hybrid
system.
Interestingly, an emergent result is the conclusion that infinite precision and
unbounded precision are of the same ontological nature, as the computational
process has taught us for decades (see [5]). Different experiments imply a con-
clusion similar to that of the work on neural nets in the 1990s (see [30]): to
compute up to time t,5 only O(f(t)) bits of the unknown are needed, where f is
a function depending on the undergoing experiment. This result is more about
the nature of numbers and arithmetic than about physics or neurodynamics.
Indeed, since the Turing machine and the measurement device are of the same
ideal nature, the motivations for their study can be exchanged. From the physical
sciences point of view, what does the idea of a Turing machine connected with an
abstract physical device (that cannot be built) offer? The orthodox motivation
for studying Turing machines in computer science applies: the theory is able
to describe the logical and algorithmic nature, scope and limits of a computer.
Equivalently, our theory is able to describe the logical and algorithmic nature,
scope and limits of experiments that make measurements. Our results suggest
logical and algorithmic aspects of measurement matter.
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